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Abstract The BER-3 Project of the emergency 
preparedness programme (BER) of the Nordic 
Co-operation Organisation (NKS) organised a 
decision conference to address the following ob-
jectives. 
1. To achieve a common understanding be-
tween decision makers and local govern-
ment officials on the one hand and the ra-
diation protection community on the other 
of the issues that arise in decisions in the 
aftermath of a major nuclear accident. 
2. To identify issues which need to be consid-
ered in preparing guidance on intervention 
levels. 
3. To explctc the use of decision conferencing 
as a format for major decision making. 
To achieve these objectives the participants were 
invited to consider a scenario of a hypothetical 
radiation accident. The scenario assumed that 
appropriate early protective actions (sheltering, 
issuing of iodine tablets, etc.) had been taken and 
that the conference was meeting some eight days 
into the accident to consider medium and longer 
term protective actions, particularly the need for 
relocation of certain areas. By the end of the con-
ference, considerable consensus on the general 
form of the strategy had emerged. Moreover, 
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there was a better understanding of the evalua-
tion criteria against which such a strategy needed 
to be developed. 
Many felt that it was important to retain flex-
ibility in the strategy of protective actions, even 
if this increased the uncertainty for the affected 
population, who would not know exactly what 
would be done for several months. This empha-
sised even more the need for good communica-
tion and understandable presentations of the 
adopted strategy. All felt that more research and 
advice is needed on the psychological effects of 
such accidents and the effects of protective ac-
tions. It was felt that the exercise had illustrated 
the problems inherent in radiation emergencies. 
However, a different situation with larger popu-
lations could have led to different results. 
It was agreed that the exercise had been useful 
in meeting the need to think about the issues 
before an accident happens. On the general mat-
ter of intervention levels, it was suggested that 
guidance should not constrain the authorities 
into doing something which might not be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of an 
accident. It needed to recognise, for instance, 
that one can evacuate small numbers of people 
but not large cities. 
Grafisk Service, Risø, 1993 
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1 Introduction 
The BER-3 Project of the emergency prepared-
ness programme (BER) of the Nordic Co-opera-
tion Organisation (NKS) Programme organised a 
itcmtm conference' on December Sth-9th, 1992 at 
the Civil Defence High School at Snekkersten, 
Denmark. The objectives of the conference were 
threefold: 
1. To achieve a common understanding be-
tween decision makers and local govern-
ment officials on the one hand and the ra-
diation protection community on the other 
of the issues that arise in decisions in the 
aftermath of a major nuclear accident. 
2. To identify issues which need to be consid-
ered in preparing guidance on intervention 
levels. 
3. To explore the use of decision conferencing 
as a format for major decision making. 
To achieve these objectives several local gov-
ernment officials, emergency planners and mem-
bers of the radiation protection community in 
the Nordic countries (A list of participants is gi-
ven at Annex 1) were invited to consider a sce-
nario of a hypothetical radiation accident. This 
was developed from one in the BER-3.2 Report. 
The accident was assumed to have happened on 
December 1st, 1992 and had left the North of the 
island of Gotland significantly contaminated, 
caused by a heavy snowfall during the plume pas-
sage. Appropriate early protective anions (shel-
tering, issuing of iodine tablets, etc.) had been 
taken, and the conference met eight days into the 
accident to consider medium and longer term 
protective actions, particularly the need for relo-
cation of certain areas. Every participant had 
been circulated with a brief description of the 
first three days of the accident beforehand: see 
Annex 2. Some - the technical experts who in 
reality would be much more closely in touch 
with the detailed situation • were sent a more 
technical briefing just before the meeting: see 
Annex 3. 
It was realised from the outset that total real-
ism could not be obtained, and many flaws with 
the form of the exercise and the scenario were 
noted both before and during vhe conference. 
Clearly no papers circulated beforehand could si-
mulate the level of knowledge that each partici-
pant would have had in a true emergency. The 
data were lacking in many respects, particularly 
in relation to the level of uncertainty that might 
be expected on some of the Measurements and 
the distributions of dose in both space and time. 
The response of the public and the media to the 
emergency had not been simulated in any re-
spect. The conference involved rather more 
people than would have taken pan in a single 
country's emergency response. Abo technical 
support would have been far greater in practice, 
with many more modelling and dose prediction 
ptogramnifs available. Because of its exploratory 
nature, several decisions were taken during the 
conference to limit the discussion to a few poss-
ible relocation strategies, to take on trust certain 
estimates of cost, to assume that most of the pub-
lic would adopt the advice given by officials, etc. 
None the less, within these limitations the parti-
cipants entered into the conference willingly and 
gave valuable and realistic opinions and judge-
ments as required. The BER-3 and the confer-
ence organisers are grateful to them all for the 
spirit and the enthusiasm that they showed. 
Confidentiality was discussed at the outset. It 
was agreed that a decision would be made at the 
end of the conference on what might be reported 
more widely, but until then all discussion would 
be confidential. At the end of the second day, all 
participants agreed that the discussion and the 
models could be reported, subject to the points 
made in the preceding paragraph being noted: 
namely, that no exercise could simulate reality 
perfectly and that their deliberations had been 
limited by lack of certain data, etc. 
The report is organised as follows. The early sec-
tions focus on the discussion and conclusions 
drawn and thus address the first two objectives of 
the conference. The concluding section reflects 
on the nature of decision conferencing and its 
success or otherwise as a format for running such 
meetings. 
1
 Briefly a decision conference is a two or three day meeting in which a group of decision makers gather 
to consider major strategic issues. The distinguishing feature of a decision conference is that the 
decision makers are suppoorted in their deliberation by a facilitator and an analyst, who do not 
contribute to the content of the discussion but rather focus their attention on the decision making 
process, helping the decision makers achieve a shared understanding through the use of decision 
modeling. Further details are given in Section 6. 
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2 Concerns and Issues 
The conference began with a wide-ranging de-
bate of many of the issues and concerns that the 
scenario stimulated. 
• The word 'acceptable' was used on many oc-
casions: e.g. acceptable risk. Some felt 'tolera-
ble' was a more appropriate word to use in 
most, if not all circumstances. All felt that 
what was acceptable or tolerable was to be the 
subject of the two days' disomies. 
• The question of budget was raised. Would the 
cost of protective actions be a limiting factor? 
It was felt that the limited scale of the acci-
dent would mean that money would be made 
available for all the protective actions that 
might be considered and that total cost would 
not be a constraint, although 'value for 
money' issues would be of concern. It was 
pointed out that, had the accident led to parts 
of Copenhagen being contaminated, the costs 
would have been far greater due to the greater 
density of population and total cost would 
nave been a serious issue. 
• Time scales: how far into the future should 
protective actions be planned? Some felt that 
strategies should look to the next few weeks 
without making longer term commitments. It 
was felt strongly by the decision makers that 
flexibility would be an important attribute of 
the strategies. Waiting for liie snow to melt 
and determining actual rather than predicted 
contamination was felt to be important. How-
ever, others felt that, firstly, predictions of 
contamination would be relatively accurate: 
there was much experience in Scandinavia of 
predicting contamination after the melting of 
snow. Secondly, and more importantly to 
them, the public would be concerned if the 
protective actions' strategy left too many un-
certainties. People would want to know how 
long they were being evacuated and whether 
permanent relocation was necessary. 
• It was agreed that if any evacuation2 was for 
longer than a year, this should be looked 
upon as permanent relocation. 
• Issues related to psychological stress, social 
and political acceptability and public confi-
dence were discussed many times in the con-
ference. It was acknowledged that psychology 
1
 The terminology used in the conference is folio« 
terminology 'temporary or permanent relocation' 
cat stress could lead to health effects of a com-
parable nature to those arising from the con-
tamination and at the same time reduces the 
quality of life significantly. Many of the 
points made in Eranen and Salo (1992) were 
repeated in the conference. 
• All agreed that it was of paramount impor-
tance to ensure that communications with the 
public were dear and that the advice given 
was both transparent and supported by easily 
understood reasons. Because of the unanimity 
on this, the issue of communications was not 
discussed in detail during the meeting: it was 
assumed that whatever strategy was adopted, 
emphasis would be placed on conveying it 
dearly and understandably to the public. 
• There was a need for the short term and long-
er term protective actions to be consistent. 
Both for the public to understand the mea-
sures and for them to be applied fairly, the 
different aspects of the strategy must cohere. 
If public confidence was not maintained, the 
ability of the authorities to continue to deal 
with this aeddent and also to deal with future 
accidents would be severely reduced. The im-
portance of monitoring the public's attitude 
towards the authorities handling of events 
was noted. It was suggested that information 
on this can be obtained within a week, especi-
ally if its collection planned in advance. Thus 
in a real conference taking place some eight 
days after an aeddent it would be possible to 
have information available on the public's at-
titudes. 
• It was also agreed that no strategy in this sce-
nario would involve compulsion. Only ad-
vice, albeit strong advice, would be given by 
the authorities. 
• Once advice had been given the authorities 
would have to bear the cost of following that 
advice. Thus in evaluating the strategies, 
their full cost was assumed to fall on the au-
thorities. It was recognised that in practice 
cost might be reduced because of non-com-
pliance or because members of the public 
used their own resources, but no allowance 
for this was made in the modelling. 
in this repon. ICRP, for instance, recommend the 
periods in excess of one week. 
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• It was noted that there would be differences 
frrr^TnTftTiTTmirlianrir"nThthTiifrr;'*»tt,M" 
by young and old families. Those with young 
children and particularly those who were 
pregnant would be more likely to relocate. 
Older families would be more likely to re-
main whatever the advice. It was also noted 
that whole families would need to be reloca-
ted or evacuated. Moreover, 
the community would need to relocate if 
others did: eg. school teachers, if all the 
younger families left the region. 
Security would be an issue. If properties were 
left unoccupied, their security would need 
maintaining 
3 Development of the Decision Models 
During the two days, a sequence of multi-attri-
bute value decision models was built, each refin-
ing the perspective brought by the previous one 
For a description of the form of such models, see, 
e.g., French (1986), Locbard, Schneider and 
French (1992) or Gjørup et al (1992). 
The criteria for evaluating possible strategies 
were discussed upon many occasions. Issues rela-
ted to social acceptability, psychological stress 
and the confidence of the population at wide in 
the authorities were repeatedly considered. The 
hierarchy of evaluation criteria or attributes gi-
ven below is that used in the final' evaluation on 
the second afternoon. 
Evaluation Criteria 
Overall 
I 
Effects 
r 
Health 
Cost Radiation Individual 
related Dose 
Social/ 
Psychological Political 
Acceptability 
HexJbflity 
Figure I: Hierarchy of evaluation criteria used in the fatal decision model 
The different evaluation criteria or attributes were 
defined as follows. 
Cost 
The cost calculated in MSEK allowing for the 
cost of relocation per person, the costs of evacua-
tion per person, the cost of lost capital and lost 
land, and the cost of decontaminating regions. 
Health 
The effect on health was seen as having three 
components. The following abreviations were 
used for these. 
Radiation Related Health Effects, Expected 
number of cancers saved by averting the col-
lective dose, calculated by applying a risk fac-
tor of 5% to the dose in manSv (ICRP). 
Rj$#-R-676(EN) 7 
I Dose Heafch Effects. Concerns for 
the well being of pregnant women and for 
children as well as for other individuals was 
expressed through the maximum expected in-
dividual dose in the first month if the strategy 
were applied. 
I Heakh Effects. Loss of quality 
of life, destruction of social networks, tempor-
ary accommodation, radiation fears, increased 
rawc nf A n t i n g ninhml—y K—irtinw nt fami. 
ly size, etc. causing stress, depression, and 
other clinical effects which might lead to in-
creased morbidity and mortality. 
Social/Political AtttpUhitoj 
Acceptance of the population and agreement that 
the authorities have dealt with the situation ade-
quately. 
flexibility 
Ability of the authorities to react to the evolving 
situation. In particular, it was felt that leaving 
certain decisions about deconiaminaiioa to die 
Spring would be particularly advantageous. 
Strategics 
Seven strategies for protecting the population 
were considered' in the early decision models 
and an eighth was added during the construction 
of the final models. The eight strategies are de-
fined in the tabic bdow in terms of their treat-
ment of areas I, II and HI, which were the areas 
significantly contaminated. It was agreed that all 
strategies should be advisory: i.e. no member of 
the public would be compelled to evacuate or 
whatever. The authorities would merely advise 
strongly that members of the public should 
comply with the suggested measures. It was also 
agreed that the costs of following the advice 
would have to be borne by the authorities. The 
terminology adopted was that 'evacuation' was a 
temporary measure (in this case for six months), 
during which time property would be kept secure 
for the population to return to at the end of the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 1 
e i 
7 1 
• 
TtUt 1: The Strmtgm 4 
funmmms 1,11villi 
i 
U 
1AM 
-
• 
Mi 
ijja 
fmtdm flflnuf 
-
1 
U 
UMB 
-
« 
Mi 
-
• f«Ww* 
period. Relocation was permanent: relocated 
households would leave their homes and commu-
nities for the foreseeable future and begin again 
elsewhere. Decontanunation was interpreted as 
adopting procedures described by Brown, Hey-
wood and Roed (1992) m their middle category. 
The numbers of people affected by these strate-
gies, the collective doses that would be averted, 
the maximum individual dose in the first month 
and the costs are given in Table 2 below. The 
costs were calculated using the figures given in 
Annex 3 and also those in Brown et al (1992). 
Note that it was assumed that decontamination 
of rural land costed the same as decontamination 
of urban land: S MSEK per km2. 
The decision model was built using the soft-
ware package HIVIEW (Barclay, 1917). This 
package allows subjective scales of preference, 
such as those needed by the evaluation criteria 
social/political acceptability and psychological 
health effects, to be assessed and used easily. 
However, it does require that all scales increase 
in numerical value with preference: higher num-
bers always represent more preferred alternatives. 
Thus in the analyses that follow ktgfm scores for 
costs, for instance, correspond to ctanvr costs. 
Moreover, it is more convenient in using the 
package to normalise all scales to run between a 
minimum value of 0 and an maximum value of 
100. The collective doses averted, the individual 
doses and the costs given above were transformed 
' It should be emphasized that had the exercise been 'for real' many more strategics would have been 
considered. It is likely that in a real analysis the strategics would have been refined in each cycle of 
model building to capture the insights gained during that cycle. In the exercise it was decided to work 
with these rough strategies so that attention could be focused on other issues such as the evaluation 
criteria. 
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Stingy No RtiocaMd No Evacuated Coaio* I t e Cost 
doaeavwtod ndwhtwdoa* jMSEK) 
(aanSv) (nSv) 
i 0 0 0 39 0 
2 0 1*05 213 23 917 
3 0 2795 2*3 10 1S12 
4 0 6S30 399 3 35S2 
5 1805 0 731 23 3015 
6 1805 990 801 10 3909 
7 1805 4825 917 3 5859 
8 0 6630 290 3 597 
TMt2: The w i w j tvmamtd ami nioateå, the celleam ernes avtnti. At mmxtmwm iWiiiaWdwp «W 
the coos of the strategies 
linearly to 0-100 scales and their different 'rela-
tive lengths' taken account of in the weighting 
factors described bdow. 
The scales for the other criteria were deve-
loped fudgementally after much discussion and 
given the values below. 
Psycbutofkal Health Effects: 
S*a»gy 
Scorn 
1 
20 
2 
60 
3 
80 
4 
100 
5 
0 
6 
20 
7 
30 
8 
SO 
Strategy 5 was given the lowest score because it 
relocated area I and thus probably causing con-
siderable stress to the inhabitants there: yet, at 
the same time it did nothing for the inhabitants 
of areas II and III, leaving their stress from the 
concerns about contamination unaddressed. 
Strategy 4, on the other hand, treated all three 
areas sympathetically, offering the reassurance of 
decontamination policies without causing any-
one the stress of permanent relocation. The other 
strategies were set into this scale using similar 
arguments. Strategy 1, which offered nothing to 
inhabitants of any area, was the subject of much 
debate. In value of 20 was only adopted as a ten-
tative first suggestion. However, since this strat-
egy did not stand out in the final analysis as one 
the group were inclined to choose, there was no 
need to refine the value further. 
1m ialiTulitw a l f ln1 plauililj 
saw 
Scorn 
i 
0 
2 3 4 5 
100 100 100 60 
6 
60 
7 
60 
8 
30 
Strategy 1 was felt to be the least acceptable to 
the public: the authorities could not be seen to be 
'doing nothing'. Strategies 2,3 and 4 were felt to 
be equally good in that the protective actions 
were dearly targeted and, if adopted, both ap-
peared and would be the result of careful deli-
beration. Similarly, strategies 5, 6, and 7 were 
equally good although less so that 2,3 and 4. 
Flexibility: 
Strategy 
Scorn 
i 
0 
2 
70 
3 4 5 
85 100 0 
6 
15 
7 8 
30 100 
Strategies 4 and 8 were felt to be equally the 
most flexible. They allowed some of the deci-
sions concerning decontamination, if any, and 
return to the area to be left to the Spring: there 
was an opportunity to reconsider the decision 
then in the light of events. Strategies 1 and 5 
were felt to be the least flexible in that they an-
nounced that no action was needed for areas II 
and III. 
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There was BMich discussion concerning the ap-
propriate weights to use in the omdel- Initially, 
the weight of the radiation related health effects 
scale, i-e. the collective dose averted scale, was set 
to 100. The length' of this scale in manSv is 917. 
The cost scale has a length of 5659 MSEK. Since 
the reconunended alpha value up to 600400 SEK 
per manSv would be reasonable and since the 
model normalises the lengths of all scales to 100, 
this suggests a weight of (5659*917*0 6 ) ) . 1000 
for die cost scale relative to the averted dose 
scale. The weights of the other scales were set 
iudgemcntaUy. The maximum individual dose 
scale has a length of (39-3) mSv, Le. 36 mSv. It 
was felt that this was three times as important as 
the maximum collective dose of 917 manSv 
Table 3: Weights andscores used m the aarial analysis 
4 Analysis of the Model 
Multi-attribute value analysis begins by simply 
multiplying each score by the appropriate weight 
and aggregating to give an overall score for each 
strategy. A simple cost-benefit model comparing 
the cos« of the strategies with the collective dose 
saved using an alpha value of 600,000 SEK is 
obtained by setting all weights to zero except for 
those on costs and radiation related health ef-
fects, which are left at 1000 and 100, respectively. 
Doing this gives a ranking of actions as given in 
Table 4. It can be seen that strategy 1, that of 
'doing nothing' is just optimal. Nou: The overall 
scores have been normalised so that a score of 
100 on both cost and radiation related health 
scales would give an overall score or 100. 
When all the weights are set to their values in 
Table 3, i.e. when all criteria are included in the 
analysis, the overall scores and ranking are as 
given in Tabic 5. It can be seen that introducing 
the other concerns modelled by the evaluation 
which might be averted. Thus the weight of the 
individual dose scale was set at 300. Reducing the 
psychological effects from their worst level under 
strategy 5 to their best level under strategy 4 was 
considered equal in importance to averting a col-
lective dose of 917 manSv, giving a weight to the 
psychological scale of 100- The sodalrpolitical ac-
ceptabiliry scale was similarly judged to have a 
weight of 100. In contrast, the difference in flex-
ibility between the best and worst stmegits on 
this the flexibility scale was fudge to be only 
worth half the radiation related health effects 
scale and accordingly given a weight of 50. Thus 
the model analysed initially had the weights and 
scores given in Table 3. 
criteria swings the decision away from 'doing no-
thing' to strategy S, which protects areas I, II and 
III by relocation or evacuation, but does not de-
contaminate any area. The optimality of this 
strategy arises because of the high cost of decon-
tamination; 5 MSEK per km1. Indeed, strategy 8 
was introduced into the analysis to confirm this 
insight. 
Strategy 
Overal 
Score 
HaVlk 
1 2 3 
90 78 64 
1st 3rd «h 
4 S 6 7 8 
37 49 36 9 84 
6lh Sff) 7»i fth 2nd 
Table 4: Overall Køret for 'timpU cost benefit' 
analysis. 
Cnwnon 
Costs 
Riflratmn nlwdfw Jffi 
MMdualdoM 
Psycrntogcai 
"in I I I |K>Wl l l JLL>[H<J*f> 
FteubMy 
WtegN 1 2 3 
1000 100 S3 67 
100 0 23 30 
300 0 44 SO 
100 20 60 80 
100 0 100 100 
SO 0 70 85 
4 5 6 7 8 
36 46 30 0 89 
43 79 87 100 31 
100 44 80 100 100 
100 0 20 30 50 
100 60 60 60 30 
100 0 15 30 100 
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Strategy 
O w a l 
Scot* 
Rank 
1 2 
61 72 
« h 2nd 
3 
71 
3rd 
4 
58 
sti 
5 
44 
6ti 
6 
44 
Sti 
7 
30 
Sti 
• 
62 
1st 
Tabte 5: OoenU 
istmes 
for At 
mTaUe3 
C 
v 
t 
Sk 
i 
i 
*8-
48-
28-
5 
poiot in the upper right cocacr. It can be seen 
from this diagram that strategies 1, tand 4 lie on 
the upper right boundary (efficient or Panto). 
Which is optimal depends on the weight put on 
Costs, which defines the trade-off between Costs 
and the other effects. Optimality moves from 
strategy 1 ID strategy S and then to strategy 4 as 
the weight on Cost decreases front 100% to 0%: 
cX Figures 2 and 3. Strategies 5, 6 and 7 can 
clearly never be optimal without considerable 
changes in their of the scores and weights: strate-
gies 1,4 and t dominate them (Le. offer a bener 
choice). Strangles 2 and 3 are abo dominated by 
strategies 1,4 and t; but far less clearly. 
Values of 2 to 15 MSEK per manSv had been 
used on occasions in decisions within the nuclear 
industry. Obviously,in these decisions there had 
been other objectives than just monetary cost and 
dose reduction. It was argued that 'alpha values' 
arc only "ball park' figure. If 2.5 MSEK per 
manSv is used as the alpha value, the weight on 
the costs nib from 1000 to 240 and die overall 
scores and tanking becomes that given in Table 
8 2i ø i i ^ I N 
?ota! veiyfct w Casts 
Figure 2: Sensumty analysis on Costs. 
The recommended 'alpha value' of 600400 
SEK was felt by many of the rather low or, equi-
valenily, the weight on Costs was felt to be rather 
high. A sensitivity analysis on the weight on 
Costs is shown in Figure 2. Currently the weight 
on Costs is 1000 which is about 60% of the total 
weight in the model (1650). The vertical line 
marks this value. Corresponding to each strategy 
is a line which plots the overall score for a strat-
egy against the percentage of total weight on 
Costs. The current optimaliry of strategy 8 is 
shown because its plot gives the highest intersec-
tion with the vertical line. 
As the weight on Costs decreases from 60%, 
strategy 8 stays optimal until the weight is about 
28% when strategy 4 becomes optimal. The 
change in optimal strategy is indicated by the 
shading in the sensitivity analysis diagram. 
Further insights can be obtained by consider-
ing the plot shown in Figure 3. To interpret this 
figure, remember that increasing scores go with 
increasing preference. Thus lower costs have 
higher scores. The figure plots the overall score 
for all effects excluding cost against cost. Ideally 
one would like a strategy to be represented by a 
188-
1 
e 
t 
s 
8fT? 
68-
« -
?d.; 
0 
CD 
/ ? \ 
\ 2 / 
vL-' 
<D 
<1> 
CI) 
0 
Strat i 
Strar 2 
Strar 3 
Strat 4 
Strat 5 
Stpar é 
Srrar ? 
28- C!) Stra? 3 
28 48 68 
Costs 
88 188 
Figure 3: Plotof'Effects against Costs. 
Strategy 
Overall 
Score 
Rank 
1 2 3 
29 62 74 
6tfi 4th 3rd 
4 
76 
1st 
5 
43 
7»h 
6 
55 
6th 
7 8 
56 75 
5th 2nd 
Table 6: Overall scons for the analysis when an 
alpha value of 2.5 MSEKper manSv is used. 
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Thus the analysis now points to strategy 4 
being the best with strategy 8 a very dose second. 
This corresponded closely to the general view of 
the participants. Indeed, many felt that in prac-
tice there would be little difference between the 
two strategies. Whichever was implemented, de-
cisions concerning areas to be decontaminated 
and the methods to be employed would be de-
ferred until the Spring. Strategies 4 and S simply 
The decision for a maiority of the participants 
was for a strategy somewhere between 4 and S. 
Indeed, many participants felt that in practice 
there would be little difference between these 
strategies when implemented, since many sub-
decisions concerning decontamination and re-
turn from evacuation would be defciied until the 
Spring when more information would be avail-
able. Strategies 4 and S esset, tially give best and 
worse case costings on what would be done, along 
with upper and lower bounds on the dose aver-
ted. 
It was. also noted that in a conference focused 
on a real problem more strategies would have 
been considered. One member felt that evacua-
ting and decontaminating areas I and II as well as 
selectively decontaminating area III would be a 
strategy which deserved serious consideration. 
Strategy 1, the option of doing nothing, which 
would be the optimal course of action when aver-
ted collective dose and financial cost are the only 
attributes considered using the Nordic recom-
mended 'alpha' value of 0.6 MSEK/manSv, was 
the least preferred alternative in the full analysis. 
It scored badly on every criteria except cost. 
Many felt that it was important to retain flex-
ibility in the strategy of protective actions, even 
if this increased th' uncertainty for the popula-
tion of Gotland v .iicb would not know exactly 
what would be done for several months. This 
emphasised even more the need for good corn-
provided best and worst case estimates of cost 
and collective dose saved for the course of action 
that the authorities would be likely to follow. 
The above analysis developed over the two 
days as scores and weights were refined in the 
light of growing understanding of the issues. 
Many other sensitivity analyses were carried out, 
but none cast doubt on the general conclusions 
reached. 
municaiion and understandable presentations of 
the adopted strategy. It was also noted that flex-
ibility would be needed in order to cope with the 
individual strategies adopted by people on Got-
land, who might choose to not to follow the offi-
cially advised protective actions. 
It was felt that the exercise had illustrated the 
problems inherent in radiation emergencies. 
However, a different situation with larger popu-
lations could have led to different results. None 
the less, the evaluation criteria, by and large, 
would have been appropriate to other situations, 
albeit with different emphases and weights. They 
would simply have led to a different choice of 
protective anions. 
The exercise had been useful in that one needs 
to think about the issues before an accident hap-
pens. 
All felt that more research and advice is nee-
ded on the psychological effects of such accidents 
and the effects of protective actions. 
On the general matter of intervention levels, it 
was suggested that guidance should be flexible in 
order not to constrain the authorities into doing 
something which might not be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of an accident. It nee-
ded to recognise, for instance, that one can 
evacuate small numbers of people but not large 
cities. 
5 Conclusions from the Decision Conference 
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6 Reflections on Decision Conferencing 
Decision conferencing is a technique - process 
might be a better word - which seeks to support 
to a group facing a complex strategic problem. At 
a decision conference, the group are aided in 
their discussions by a facilitator and, usually, an 
analyst, who attend to the process and decision 
modelling, leaving the group free to concentrate 
on the content of their problem. Neither the faci-
litator nor the analyst are expert in the decision 
problem facing the decision makers. They assist 
the conference by keeping the discussion focused 
on the problem in hand, and ensuring that all 
present both contribute their views and fully un-
derstand the points made by the other decision 
makers, helping create a shared understanding of 
both the problem and the way forward. 
The facilitator and analyst build decision mod-
els of the choice facing the group, projecting the 
results on a large screen for all the group to see. 
Typically a sequence of models is built, each a 
revision or development of the previous, to pace 
with the group's evolving view of the problem. 
The modelling invariably leads to much discus-
sion within the group. During the sensitivity 
analysis phase the results of the model are ex-
amined using a wide range of numerical values 
for the judgements upon which the group cannot 
agree. Often the final ranking of alternative stra-
tegies is unchanged or insignificantly affected by 
variations across the whole range of numerical 
values proposed by members. In some cases, of 
course, significant changes in the ranking do oc-
cur and the group must discuss the values fur-
ther. 
French (1992) argues: 
»The choice of intervention levels and other 
countenneasures following a nuclear accident 
is not simply a technical problem. Political, 
social, economic and other non-tangible issues 
are inevitably involved. Decision conferen-
cing is a technique which gathers together all 
important parties to the decision making for a 
two day meeting at which all relevant con-
cerns can be discussed and possible protection 
strategies evaluated. The process is supported 
by the use of interactive software through 
which multi-attribute and other decision 
models may be built to help the decision ma-
kers explore the issues. Typically, decision 
conferences are creative events, constructing 
strategies as well as evaluating them.« 
The meeting reported here is clearly a test of 
that claim: and, indeed, the third objective of the 
meeting was to explore the potential of decision 
conferencing in such circumstances. 
During the concluding discussion several 
points were made which arc relevant to this issue. 
• All had felt that having many varied perspec-
tives present in the meeting have been useful. 
It had contributed to a fuller and shared un-
derstanding of the problems likely to be faced 
in the event of a major nuclear accident. 
• Most felt that the software had been useful. 
Its graphical, visual display of sensitivity ana-
lyses bad helped focus discussion. Some com-
mented that they already use projected com-
puter output in their meetings and the exten-
sive use of such during a decision conference 
was a natural progression from this. 
• There was a suggestion that the meeting 
would have progressed faster if the evaluation 
criteria had been defined more fully earlier. 
However, that may be a comment made with 
hindsight. It is commonly found in decision 
conferences that one repeatedly revisits the 
definition of the criteria during the two days 
as understanding of the issues evolves. Such 
an iterative, evolutionary process seems al-
most inevitable. Ab initio definition of criter-
ia is very difficult. 
• Because of the nature of the exercise, the set 
of strategies was kept more or less fixed dur-
ing the conference. If the conference had been 
for real, the set of strategies would undoubt-
edly have evolved as understanding of the is-
sues, cost and effects grew. It is worth noting 
here that the introduction of strategy 8 oc-
curred because the relative expense of decon-
tamination became apparent during the 
analysis of a preliminary model. 
• Much more technical support would have 
been available in a real conference. For in-
stance, when a new strategy was suggested, 
there would have been manpower available to 
cost it and to predict its effect in terms of 
averted dose and maximum individual dose. 
This would have meant that discussion might 
have developed faster and in a more focused 
manner than it did at the meeting. 
• There was a feeling that the meeting was too 
large at nearly thirty participants. Much of 
the reason for its size was to ensure adequate 
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representation of the five Nordic countries. Cer-
tainly in real circumstances, a decision confer-
ence would be smaller, and the grouping more 
tightly focused on the issues deriving from real 
circumstances. So perhaps this would not have 
been a problem in a real conference. 
• One panicipant suggested that whether or not 
decision conferencing would be a useful tool 
in the event of a real emergency, it was clearly 
a useful tool in stimulating discussion in 
planning and emergency preparedness, as it 
had been at this conference. 
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Annex 1: Participants 
The following participated at the decision con-
ference: 
DK Knud Bork Kristoffersen, 
Civilforsvarsstyrelsen, 
H. P. Ryder, 
Civilforsvarsstyrelsen, 
KåreUIbak, 
Statens Institut for Strålehygiejne, 
Kasper Vilstrup, 
Vilstrup Research, BER-3, 
Ole Walmod-Larsen, 
Risø, BER-3, 
Henny Frederiksen, 
BER-3 (secretary), 
S Gunnar Bengtsson, 
Statens Strålskyddsinstitutt, 
Jack Valentin, 
Statens Suilskyddsinstitutt, 
Carolina Dickson, 
Enhet 6, Dept. f. miljo och nat.res., 
Carl Axel Hennansson, 
Forsvarsdept., 
Erik Osterberg, 
lånsstyT.i Hallands lån, 
Lars Johan Svensson, 
lånsstyT.i Hall.lån, 
Ola Fischer, 
lånsstyrelsen, Malmohus lån, 
Claes Joran Dahlqvist, 
lånsstyrelsen, Kalmar lån, 
Monica Gustafsson, 
Vattenfall, BER-3, 
SF Antti Vuorinen, 
STUK, 
Tapio Rytomaa, 
STUK, 
Kari Sinkko, 
STUK, BER-3 (analyst), 
Hannele Aaltonen, 
STUK, 
Anneli Salo, 
BER-3, 
Janne Koivukoski, 
Inrikesmin., 
Markku Haranne, 
Nylands len, 
Liisa Erånen, 
Univ. of Helsinki, BER-3, 
N Steinar Backe, 
SSV, 
Erik Anders Westerlund, 
SSV, 
Svein Uhnger, 
Fylkesmannen i Finmark, 
Arne W. Karlsen, 
Fylkesmannen i Buskerud, 
IS SigurSur Magnusson, 
SIS, Reykjavik, 
GB Simon French, 
Leeds University (facilitator). 
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Annex 2: Summary of Scenario 
Several days before the conference, all partici-
pants were sent the following scenario, which 
had been developed for the purpose by Kari 
Sinkko and Ole Walmod-Larsen assisted by An-
il is a difficult task to make a scenario relevant to 
all participants coming from almost all corners of 
Scandinavia. We suggest however the following: 
A serious reactor accident has happened in Li-
thuania at a site around five hundred kilometres 
east of the island of GOTLAND. 
It could have been: KIRKENES or ÅLAND 
or HEYMAY or BORNHOLM or LÆSØ or... 
- Anyhow it is within YOUR area of 
responsibility!! 
In the morning on Tuesday Dec. 1st. informa-
tion was received from Lithuania, at the contact 
point pursuant to the convention on early notifi-
cation, that a serious accident had happened at 2 
o'clock in the morning at the RBMK REACTOR 
STATION, unit 1. As a consequence of the acci-
dent a large release of radioactivity had taken 
place. 
In the following days contact points received 
an increasing flow of details about the accident 
from Lithuania. A still unknown amount of fuel 
in the unit 1 reactor had been overheated result-
ing in a sudden, large release of fresh fission 
products to the atmosphere. 
Of still unknown reasons, several fuel channels 
had probably ruptured simultaneously and the 
massive concrete slab above the reactor had lif-
ted. As all the fuel channels are fitted to this slab 
it can be expected that most of them have been 
damaged. For the same reason, the majority of 
the control rods failed to function. Due to the 
fact that the slab went back into its position, the 
release was however limited and it was further 
possible to supply some cooling and to limit and 
later extinguish a graphite fire. 
neli Salo, all of the BER-3 Project. Plume disper-
sion and dose predictions were calculated by Juk-
ka Rossi, Technical Research Centre of Finland 
using the software package ARANO. 
The weather in the area from Lithuania to 
Gotland Tuesday night and Wednesday morning 
was stable with steady winds from the east. 
In the Gotland area at noon time Wednesday a 
front passage from the west made the weather 
unstable with showers of rain and later heavy 
showers of wet snow. Thursday and Friday fall-
ing temperatures and decreasing winds from the 
west were prevailing in the Gotland area. The 
mainland had - and still has - stable conditions 
with clear sky and weak winds from the west. 
Based on the weather forecast the flight mon-
itoring team was sent east and southeast of Got-
land over the Baltic sea on Wednesday morning. 
The preliminary dose predictions and the ob-
servation of the plume by the flight monitoring 
team on SE of Gotland made it clear that the 
inhabitants of the island had to be warned and 
iodine tablets distributed. People were also ad-
vised to listen to the radio and follow the orders 
to be given by the authorities. 
No deterministic effects were predicted. 
A few hours later the monitoring team on the 
east coast reported a rise in the outdoor dose rate 
from the ca. 80 nSv/h background to 50 uSv/h. 
This confirmed for the experts that a plume 
had arrived and, as they were aware of the poss-
ibility of high inhalation doses, they gave advice 
of sheltering the population of the entire Got-
land. 
Immediately, at 1430 Wednesday, the Gotland 
authority decided upon 
Sheltering and Intake of Iodine Tablets 
for the whole population of Gotland. 
Scenario for the Nordic Seminar 
Decision Conference Dec. 8-9th 1992, DK 
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Gotland's total number of inhabitants is 56 
000. Approx. 21 000 are living in Visby and the 
number of pregnant women is estimated at SS0. 
Further monitoring teams and a high ranking 
expert were dispatched to the island by helicop-
ters to advise the local authorities, take on-the-
spot measurements and collect samples for analy-
sis. 
Monitoring teams were also put on guard 
along the mainland coastline towards Gotland. 
All on-line monitoring stations in the region re-
port normal conditions. 
Wednesday at 1800 a meteorological station on 
the North end of Gotland reported a layer of 3 
cm ice covered by 10 - 20 cm of snow, clear sky, 
decreasing wind towards E and temperatures fall-
ing below -10°C. 
Thursday morning the experts described the 
situation as follows: The heavy rain/snow over 
the upper pan of Gotland had caused a substan-
tial wet deposition of fresh fission products dur-
ing a plume passage in the afternoon hours of 
Wednesday. 
The plume had obviously passed the island 
from SE, then turned north meeting the showen 
over the northern end and then returned towards 
the east, leaving a deposition of radioactivity 
north of a line ca. 10 km North of Visby city 
going towards SE. 
North of this line the outdoor dose rate levels 
at I m above ground were around 60-70 uSv/h 
increasing to 400 uSv/b 30 km NE of Visby and 
further to 2 - 3 mSv/h at the northern end of 
Gotland. 
40 uSv/h was reported from the airport a few 
km north of Visby. 
Towards the south from Visby levels rapidly 
decreased. SO km south of Visby was measured 3 
times background. 
The preliminary sample analyses pointed at a 
similar pattern in the Cs-137 levels of deposition. 
In the southern part levels of few kBq/m2 were 
seen. North of Visby was found SO kBq/m2. To-
wards NE these levels grew: 30 km NE of Visby: 
0.3 MBq/m2. Towards Faro Sound was found 
several MBq/m2, and a maximum was measured 
in a sample from the centre of Firo island. 
Thursday afternoon the telecommunication 
system of Gotland became overloaded. This las-
ted till Friday morning. In this period the on-
line monitoring station in Visby did not report. 
Back on-line it showed 30 uSv/h. 
After the situation briefing Thursday morning 
the experts came to the conclusion that the 
plume had left Gotland Wednesday night. 
Therefore the sheltering action should be re-
lieved immediately for the whole island. 
It was judged however - although the informa-
tion available was incomplete - that the doses to 
be received by the inhabitants of the Firo island 
and by the inhabitants living on the main island 
at the area from Fåro Sound to 5 - 8 km SW of 
Faro Sound would become so high that they 
would have to be evacuated as soon as possible. 
At 10 o'clock on Thursday morning the Got-
land authority decided to 
Relieve the Sheltering for Gotland and 
Evacuate the Inhabitants in the Above 
Described Area. 
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Figure A2.1: Map of Gotland. 
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Annex 3: Detailed Scenario 
The foUowing detailed scenario giving technical 
data was sent roughly two days before the confer-
ence to those participants who would have had 
such information (albeii in rather larger quanti-
ties) in the event of a real accident. These detaik 
were available to all participants at the confer-
ence. 
The Nordic Seminar 
Decision Conference Dec. 8 - 9th 1992, CFH, DK 
With reference to the letter dated November 27th 
1992 hereby further information is given supple-
ment to the scenario described. In the tables be-
low we have gathered all the data which have 
been measured or predicted and which is as-
sumed to be available at this point of time. The 
information shown refer to six different fallout 
areas of Gotland. Their positions can be seen at 
the attached map. 
Noble gases 
Iodines 
Tellurium 
Cesium 
Ba,La,Sr,Ru,etc. 
all 
few ten's of percent 
few percent 
few percent 
few tenths of percent 
The foUowing shielding factors have been as-
sumed to be relevant for Gotland and have been 
used in the calculations: 
Radiation Situation 
Based upon information received from Lithuania 
at the contact point, the following fractions of the 
total core inventory are assumed to have been 
released to the atmosphere over a period of 12 
hours: 
Cloud Deposition Inhalation 
Wooden 
houses 
Blockhouses 
0.9 
0.3 
0.3 
0.03 
0.3 
0.3 
Table I. Measured average mdividual doses during the first day (mSv), dose rates on thursday morning 
(mSv/h), and ,37Cs-fattout (MBqlm2) in various areas of Gotland, see the attached map. 
Area III IV VI 
Dose (or normal conditions (mSv)* 
Dose when sheltered (mSv) 
Outdoor dose (mSv) 
Dose rate (mSv/h)" 
,37Cs-falk>ut(MBa'm>) 
33 
16 
84 
2.5 
5.0 
20 
10 
50 
1.5 
3.0 
8.6 
4.3 
22 
06 
1.3 
2.6 
1.3 
67 
0.2 
04 
0.86 
0.43 
2.2 
0.06 
0.13 
0.04 
0.02 
0.1 
0.003 
0.006 
* Normal living conditions, i.e. 10% outdoors and 90% indoors 
»* Outdoor, Thursday morning 
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Tabic II. Predicted average individual and collec-
tive doses in the subsequent six days in various 
areas of Gotland. 
Area 
Dose(mSw)-
Coaectwe* 
dosefmanSv) 
l 
47 
85 
il 
28 
28 
in 
12 
47 
IV 
3.8 
8.9 
V 
12 
8.6 
VI 
0.06 
2 4 
* Normal living conditions 
Table III. Predicted individual doses (individual ef-
fective dose; mSv) for normal living conditions in du 
su fallout areas considered for venoms time scales. 
The dose accumulated during the fast week is sub-
tracted. 
Area 
1 Month 
6 Months 
lYear 
3 Years 
10 Years 
30 Years 
70 Years 
' 
39 
86 
109 
151 
218 
317 
405 
II 
23 
52 
65 
91 
131 
190 
243 
III 
10 
22 
28 
39 
57 
82 
105 
IV 
3.1 
6.9 
87 
12.0 
17.4 
25 
32 
V 
1.0 
2.2 
2 8 
3.9 
5.7 
8 2 
10.5 
VI 
005 
010 
013 
0.18 
0.26 
038 
0.49 
Table IV. Predicted collective doses (manSv)for nor-
mal living conditions in the six fallout areas consid-
ered for various time scales. The dose accumulated 
during the first toeek is subtracted. 
Area 
1 Month 
6 Months 
i Year 
3 Years 
10 Years 
30 Years 
70 Years 
l 
70 
155 
197 
273 
393 
572 
731 
II 
23 
51 
64 
90 
130 
188 
241 
III 
38 
84 
107 
150 
219 
314 
403 
rv 
7.3 
16 
20 
28 
41 
59 
75 
V 
7.1 
15 
20 
27 
40 
58 
74 
Table V. Predicted individual ingestion doses (com-
mitted effective dose; mSv) to people for different time 
scales in the six fallout areas considered. 
Area 
lYear 
3 Years 
30 Years 
I 
63 
126 
181 
II 
38 
76 
108 
III 
16 
33 
47 
IV 
5 0 
10 
14 
V 
1.6 
3.3 
4.7 
VI 
008 
015 
022 
Milk 300 kg, meat 35 kg, grain 70 kg, green 
vegetables 40 kg, root vegetables 30 kg per capita 
is assumed to be consumed in a year. Foodstuffs 
are assumed to be produced and consumed in the 
same area. 
Taking into account that the fallout area is 
relatively small we assume that it is feasible to 
supply uncontaminated food to the entire Got-
land. 
Monetary Costs of Relocation 
Table VI. Assessed monetary casts of relocation 
(MSEK) m the three fallout anas considered for var-
ious tame scales. 
Area 
3 Years 
10 Years 
30 Years 
70 Years 
1 
3800 
1.300 
2.100 
3.000 
y 
500 
800 
1.400 
2.200 
III 
1.700 
2.600 
4.200 
5.600 
Demographic Data 
Table VIL The number of inhatuants in various 
areas considered and the area of the land (km1). 
Area 
Number of in-
habitants 
Area 
1 II 
1805 990 
150 160 
III 
3635 
280 
IV 
2350 
300 
V V« 
7020 40,203 
580 1.300 
Assessment the Monetary Costs 
of Relocation 
Calculation of the monetary costs arising from 
relocation is largely based on methods presented 
in the COCO-1 report. The costs of no-action is 
assumed to be negligible. 
Transport Costs: 
The transport costs by road for both organised 
transport using buses and private can and assum-
ing that the average distance moved is 100 km, is 
estimated to be 60 SEK/person (running costs of 
a car per km is 2.5 SEK). The transport costs by 
boat (ferry) per person is 100 SEK. 
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Transport costs per 
SEK 
per person is 160 
Loss of Income: 
It is assumed that if people are relocated, then 
they will also be unable to reach their workplace 
and that die contribution dwy would have made 
to the economy will be lost. This loss can be 
assessed from GDP per capita (GDP in Sweden is 
160,000 SEK). Note, the loss of income of far-
mers is included. A mean recovery time of econ-
omy around two years is thought to be appropri-
ate as default value. 
The loss of i 
per person is 320^ 090 SEK 
i strategies 
It is assumed that die resettlement process 
takes one year and that the costs therefore conti-
nue for an extra year. 
The value of land and its assets for various 
categories are as fbliows: 
- non-residential capital stock; 15OJD0O SEK/ 
DCROD* 
- bousing; 150,000 SEKTpmoo, 
- consumer diirables; llO^OQOSEK/person, 
- land: 
- urban areas; ISO MSEK/kmz 
- rural areas; 13 MSEK/km2. 
Raies of interest and depreciation: 
- interest rate, 5%, 
- depredation rate: 
- stock and dwellings; 5% 
- consumer durables; 10%. 
Food and Accommodation Costs: 
To avoid doable counting die simple approach 
adopted here is to estimate only the cost of lost 
accommodation. In choosing die time at which 
the costing should be stopped to be the same 
time as die cutoff time for loss of income, two 
years, and if the GDP used includes the housing 
component, then accommodation and also food 
costs are included in costs of lost income. 
Costs of Lost Capital Services: 
The cost of lost capital services is caused by the 
acceleration of depreciation due to lack of main-
tenance and by loss of interest on the original 
investment. These costs caused by the loss of 
non-residental capital stock, housing and land 
are taken into account after the cutoff time, two 
years, because GDP includes the interest on capi-
tal value. Note, the loss of income is calculated 
for the two first years using the GDP. The GDP 
does not include consumer durables and there-
fore the these costs begins at the time of the acci-
dent. The rebuilding of industry, public build-
ings, homes etc is not included as costs, as these 
costs may be regarded as being equivalent to the 
costs of the lost capital value of the lost area. 
Costs of Lost Capital Services fcrVa 
Relocation Strategies (without discounting). 
Capital Urban Land 
(MSEK/person) (MSEK/knC) 
Rural Land 
3year 
10 years 
30 years 
70 years 
on 
0.30 
0.59 
069 
15 0.13 
67 0.56 
217 1.88 
517 4.50 
»Normal« frequences of cancers in Finland in 
a year 
Leukaemia: 
Thyroid: 
All others: 
Adults: 
Children: 
Mortality: 
Adults: 
Children: 
Mortality: 
Adults: 
Children : 
Mortality: 
5-7/100,000 
5/100,000 
50% 
1-2/100,000 
0.1/100,000 
10% 
200/100,000 
100/100,000 
50% 
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Figure A3.1: Map of Gotland showing distribution of contamination. 
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The BER-3 Project of the emergency prepared-
ness programme (BER) of the Nordic Co-opera-
tion Organisation (NKS) organised a decision 
conference to address the following objectives. 
1. To achieve a common understanding be-
tween decision makers and local govern-
ment officials on the one hand and the ra-
diation protection community on the other 
of the issues that arise in decisions in the 
aftermath of a major nuclear accident. 
2. To identify issues which need to be consid-
ered in preparing guidance on intervention 
levels. 
3. To explore the use of decision conferencing 
as a format for major decision making. 
To achieve these objectives the participants were 
invited to consider a scenario of a hypothetical 
radiation accident. The scenario assumed that 
appropriate early protective actions (sheltering, 
issuing of iodine tablets, etc.) had been taken and 
that the conference was meeting some eight days 
into the accident to consider medium and longer 
term protective actions, particularly the need for 
relocation of certain areas. By the end of the con-
ference, considerable consensus on the general 
form of the strategy had emerged. Moreover, 
there was a better understanding of the evalua-
tion criteria against which such a strategy needed 
to be developed. 
Many felt that it was important to retain flex-
ibility in the strategy of protective actions, even 
if this increased the uncertainty for the affected 
population, who would not know exactly what 
would be done for several months. This empha-
sised even more the need for good communica-
tion and understandable presentations of the 
adopted strategy. All felt that more research and 
advice is needed on the psychological effects of 
such accidents and the effects of protective ac-
tions. It was felt that die exercise had illustrated 
the problems inherent in radiation emergencies. 
However, a different situation with larger popu-
lations could have led to different results. 
It was agreed that the exercise had been useful 
in meeting the need to think about the issues 
before an accident happens. On the general mat-
ter of intervention levels, it was suggested that 
guidance should not constrain the authorities 
into doing something which might not be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of an 
accident. It needed to recognise, for instance, 
that one can evacuate small numbers of people 
but not large cities. 
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